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This paper examines the role of bank lending in the transmission of 
monetary policy in the presence of capital adequacy regulations. I develop 
a dynamic model of bank asset and liability management that incorporates 
risk-based capital requirements and an imperfect market for bank equity. 
These conditions imply a failure of the Modigliani-Miller theorem for the 
bank: its lending will depend on the bank’s financial structure, as well as 
on lending opportunities and market interest rates. Combined with a 
maturity mismatch on the bank’s balance sheet, this gives rise to a ‘bank 
capital channel’ by which monetary policy affects bank lending through its 
impact on bank equity capital. This mechanism does not rely on any 
particular role of bank reserves and thus falls outside the conventional 
‘bank lending channel’. I analyze the dynamics of the new channel. An 
important result is that monetary policy effects on bank lending depend on 
the capital adequacy of the banking sector; lending by banks with low 
capital has a delayed and then amplified reaction to interest rate shocks, 
relative to well-capitalized banks. Other implications are that bank capital 
affects lending even when the regulatory constraint is not momentarily 
binding, and that shocks to bank profits, such as loan defaults, can have a 
persistent impact on lending. 
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  Traditional monetary theory has largely ignored the role of bank equity. Bank-
centered accounts of how monetary policy affects the real economy usually focus on the 
role of reserves in determining the volume of demand deposits. In addition, the ‘bank 
lending channel’ thesis maintains that monetary policy actions can also alter the supply of 
bank loans by changing bank reserves. While reserve requirements play a central role in 
these theories, bank capital
1   and capital regulations are at best discussed as an 
afterthought. This paper constitutes an attempt to fill this gap by taking the risk-based 
capital requirements of the Basle Accord explicitly into account. It provides a framework 
for analyzing the consequences of these regulations for bank lending and the response of 
lending to monetary policy actions in a dynamic setting.  
The incorporation of bank capital effects is motivated by two sets of 
considerations. First, it is generally agreed that bank capital is an important factor in bank 
asset and liability management and that its importance has likely increased since the 
implementation of the risk-based capital requirements of the 1988 Basle Accord. The 
implementation of these regulations, along with other factors, has often been blamed for a 
perceived credit crunch immediately prior and during the 1990-91 recession. In fact, the 
term ‘capital crunch’ has been suggested as a more apt description for the reduction in 
lending during this episode, in view of the role of bank capital.
2 The evidence from state 
and bank level data shows that low bank capital has been associated with sluggish 
lending during this period.
3 In addition, there is some more general evidence that the cost 
of loans depends on bank capital. Using a matched sample of individual loans, borrowers 
and banks, R. Glenn Hubbard, Kenneth N. Kuttner, and Darius N. Palia (2001) find that 
higher bank capital lowers the rate charged on loans, even after controlling for borrower 
characteristics, other bank characteristics and loan contract terms.
4 If bank capital is a 
                                                      
1 I use the terms bank equity and bank capital interchangeably to refer to the book value of bank equity. I 
will be more precise about the regulatory definitions below.  
2 Richard F. Syron (1991). See also Ben S. Bernanke and Cara S. Lown (1991). 
3 See Steven A. Sharpe (1995) for an overview. In his judgement, the research has been less successful in 
determining whether this association is due to a causal effect of bank capital on loan supply or due to the 
effect of persistent variation in loan demand on capital.  
4 In addition, Joe Peek, Eric S. Rosengren and Geoffrey M. B. Tootell (1999 and 2003) show that 
confidential supervisory bank ratings, which partly reflect capital adequacy, predict GDP growth even 
when controlling for commercial or Fed forecasts of growth. Interestingly, they also find that this 
information is used by the FOMC in decisions on the Federal Funds target rate.   3
significant determinant of loan supply, then it is important to examine the consequences 
of this dependence for the dynamics of bank lending and the monetary transmission 
mechanism.
5  
Second, taking into account capital adequacy regulations allows us to address the 
question what role bank lending plays in the monetary transmission in a world in which 
banks are increasingly able to issue nonreservable liabilities. According to the bank 
lending channel thesis, monetary policy affects the real economy at least in part through a 
direct effect on the supply of bank loans. A necessary condition for this channel to be 
operative is that banks change their loan supply in reaction to shocks to their reserves.
6 If 
banks can frictionlessly issue nonreservable liabilities, then the bank lending channel, at 
least in its standard formulation, disappears. Christina D. Romer and David H. Romer 
(1990), among others, have claimed that banks can in fact switch fairly easily to 
alternative sources of finance that carry no or lower reserve requirements, such as CDs, 
and this is one reason the bank lending channel thesis is controversial. While the precise 
extent to which banks insulate their loan supply from shocks to their reserves is still in 
debate, it does seem safe to say that the ability of banks to raise nonreservable liabilities 
has increased in the past decade. According to the standard theory, this would suggest a 
diminished role of bank lending in the transmission of monetary policy. An important 
point of this paper is that in the presence of capital requirements bank lending plays a 
special role in the transmission of monetary policy even if banks face a perfect market for 
some nonreservable liability. The model demonstrates that capital requirements generate 
a mechanism by which monetary policy shifts the supply of bank loans through its effect 
on bank capital, rather than reserves. This new mechanism relies on an imperfect market 
for bank equity rather than bank debt. The model thus provides an alternative to the 
                                                      
5 Skander J. Van den Heuvel (2001) examines empirically how the effect of monetary policy on output 
depends on bank capital. Using annual data from U.S. states, the paper finds that when a state’s banking 
sector starts out with a low capital-asset ratio, its subsequent output growth is more sensitive to changes in 
the Federal funds rate. 
6 For an overview of the theory and empirical evidence relating to the bank lending channel see Anil K. 
Kashyap and Jeremy C. Stein (1994). Bernanke and Alan S. Blinder (1988) provide a statement of the 
lending channel in terms of an IS/LM type model. Stein (1998) provides a ‘micro-founded’ adverse 
selection model of bank asset and liability management that generates a lending channel. It should be noted 
that the ‘bank lending channel’ is only a part of the body of research that recognizes that assets other than 
money and bonds may play a role in the monetary transmission mechanism. For example, William C. 
Brainard (1964) models the monetary transmission mechanism using a whole array of asset prices.   4
prevailing account of the bank lending channel that does not rely on any special role of 
reserves. It shares with the bank lending channel, however, the idea that financial 
frictions at the bank level can play a role in the monetary transmission mechanism.  
Besides capital adequacy regulations and an imperfect market for bank equity, a 
crucial feature of the model is the maturity transformation performed by banks. Bank 
loans are assumed to have longer maturity on average than the bank’s nonequity 
liabilities. A consequence of this is that a rise of the short-term interest rate affects bank 
profits negatively, which will in time deteriorate the bank’s capital adequacy. If banks 
cannot readily issue new equity, then this balance sheet effect can cause a persistent 
decline in bank lending.  
The model analyzes an individual bank’s asset and liability management problem 
in an infinite horizon setting. Each period the bank decides how many new loans to make, 
how much to invest in marketable securities and how much to pay out to shareholders as 
dividends, subject to regulatory and financial constraints. The bank faces uncertainty with 
respect to the fraction of outstanding loans that goes bad each period. In addition, the 
short interest rate is variable reflecting monetary policy actions, among other factors. 
Although the analysis is not formally embedded in a general equilibrium, some of the 
issues that would arise in such an exercise are discussed in the paper. 
The model has several main implications. First, bank lending depends on the 
financial structure of the bank. Shocks to bank profitability, such as loan defaults, have a 
persistent impact on lending. Moreover, bank capital affects lending even when the 
regulatory constraint is not momentarily binding. Second, the model generates a ‘bank 
capital channel’ by which monetary policy actions can affect the supply of bank loans 
through their impact on bank capital. Third, the strength of this channel depends on the 
capital adequacy of the banking sector and the distribution of capital across banks. In 
particular, lending by banks with low capital has a delayed and then amplified reaction to 
interest rate shocks, relative to well-capitalized banks. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses how the 
model relates to the literature. Section II presents the model, starting with a general 
discussion of the main assumptions, followed by the detailed assumptions and some 
analytical preliminaries. Section III discusses the calibration of the model as well as the   5
solution methods employed. The main results are presented in the following three 
sections. Section IV discusses the value function and optimal policy to the bank’s 
decision problem. Sections V uses the results to analyze the dynamic response of bank 
lending to monetary policy shocks, and how this impact depends on the financial 
structure of the bank in question. Section VI analyzes the impact of loan default shocks. 




I.  Related Literature 
  
The idea that banks may be subject to financial frictions, just like nonfinancial 
firms, is shared by this work with many papers, especially in the literature on the 
microeconomics of banking. This paper follows Kashyap and Stein (1995) and Stein 
(1998), among others, in arguing that these frictions can give rise to a balance sheet 
channel for financial intermediaries, just as for ordinary firms.
7 The specific frictions in 
Kashyap and Stein’s model, which give rise to the lending channel, are different from the 
ones in this paper, but in both cases the implication is that economic shocks, such as 
monetary policy actions, can affect the supply of bank loans at least in part through their 
effect on the quantity of some bank liabilities (reservable liabilities in Kashyap and 
Stein’s model; equity in this paper). 
The model presented here differs from the existing literature by incorporating 
capital requirements in a dynamic setting with endogenous bank equity. Most dynamic 
banking models with an imperfect market for bank liabilities focus on the distinction 
between insured deposits and other bank liabilities. Stein (1998) presents a two period 
adverse selection model of bank asset and liability management, which, as mentioned, 
can be viewed as providing microfoundations for the lending channel thesis.
8 The key 
distinction in Stein’s model is between reservable and nonreservable bank liabilities. 
Lending is affected by reserve shocks only if all nonreservable bank liabilities are subject 
                                                      
7 For work on the macroeconomic implications of financial frictions for nonfinancial firms, see, for 
example, Bernanke and Mark Gertler (1989), Charles T. Carlstrom and Timothy S. Fuerst (1997), and 
Bernanke, Gertler and Simon Gilchrist (1999). 
8 Kashyap and Stein (1995) contains a simplified version of the model.   6
to the adverse selection problem (i.e. are exposed to bank risk or, in the case of insured 
nonreservable liabilities, some other friction).
9 
10  There is no separate role for bank 
equity.
11  
Martin Schneider's (1998) infinite horizon model also focuses on the bank's 
limited access to money market funds, which is due to a moral hazard associated with 
strategic default. Inside equity does play a role in the model, as it mitigates the moral 
hazard problem. Thus, the bank is in effect subject to market based, rather than 
regulatory, capital requirements. Because inside equity can only be increased through 
retained earnings, this generates a ‘financial accelerator’ on the part of the bank, which 
also arises in my model.
12  
Graig Furfine (2001) presents, and estimates, a dynamic model of bank asset and 
liability management with capital adequacy regulations, captured through an exogenously 
specified continuous cost function of the risk-based capital ratio and the leverage ratio.
13 
He finds that the simulated effects of stricter capital adequacy regulation fit the facts of 
the 1990-91 credit crunch qualitatively well, whereas as well as other candidate 
explanations for bank behavior in that period do not perform as well. 
14 
                                                      
9 As mentioned in the introduction, doubt about the importance of such frictions has been a reason for 
skepticism about the importance of a bank lending channel. In the model I take this criticism head on by 
assuming that the bank faces a perfect market for some nonreservable liability. Instead of an imperfect 
market for all nonreservable liabilities, I make the less restrictive assumption that the market for bank 
equity is imperfect. 
10 Sebastian Edwards and Carlos A. Vegh (1997) show that, even in the absence of financial frictions in the 
market for nonreservable liabilities, a type of lending channel arises if there are cost complementarities 
between deposit taking and lending. The complementarity could be due to the informational content of 
borrowers’ deposits. 
11 However, it has been argued informally that bank capital can affect the strength of the lending channel. 
The argument is as follows. Better capitalized banks are less risky, which means that nonreservable and 
uninsured bank liabilities are less subject to asymmetric information problems, which improves the bank’s 
access to these liabilities and diminishes the dependence of lending on reserves by that bank. See, e.g., 
Kashyap and Stein (2000). 
12 Besides the different nature of the capital requirements, key differences with this paper are that in my 
model bank loans are assumed to have a longer maturity than bank deposits, creating interest rate risk, and 
dividends are chosen optimally. 
13 Based on existing regulations, I assume below that the capital requirements impose direct restrictions on 
the bank’s choice set when binding. An implication of my approach is that the cost of having a given 
degree of inadequate capital is endogenous. For example, low capital is more costly when lending 
opportunities are more profitable. 
14 In an earlier version of the paper (1995), Furfine also simulates the impact of the Basle capital 
regulations on the response of bank lending to a monetary policy shock. He finds that the response is much 
weaker in the presence of the capital requirements. As we will see, the present paper obtains a very 
different conclusion. The reason for this is the presence of duration transformation in my model, which 
exposes the bank to interest rate risk.   7
  Bernanke and Gertler (1987), Bengt Holmstrom and Jean Tirole (1997), Patrick 
Bolton and Xavier Freixas (2001), Nan-Huang Chen (2001) and Cesaire Meh and Kevin 
Moran (2004) present macroeconomic equilibrium models with a nontrivial role for 
financial intermediaries. A common thread is that, due to imperfect information 
problems, the intermediaries are themselves subject to credit constraints. Consequently, 
their capital is an important determinant of lending and economic activity, even though a 
regulatory capital requirement is absent. In addition, Bolton and Freixas and Meh and 
Moran analyze the monetary transmission mechanism in such a context. Though the 
mechanisms involved differ, in both papers contractionary monetary policy affects bank 
profitability adversely, which worsens the agency problem between banks and their 
suppliers of funds and can in turn lead to a decline in lending.  
The focus of this paper is not on the informational microfoundations that give rise 
to the existence of banks, bank-dependent borrowers and the longer maturity of bank 
loans. Rather, the emphasis is on a careful treatment of the joint dynamics of the bank’s 
balance sheet components and the implications thereof for bank lending and monetary 
policy. There is a large literature on the microeconomics of banking that deals with the 
former set of issues and that motivates some of the specific assumptions made in the 
model. Sudipto Battacharya and Anjan V. Thakor (1993) and Freixas and Jean-Charles 
Rochet (1997) present overviews of this literature. A common thread is that informational 
asymmetries generate a special role for bank-like intermediaries in the allocation of credit 
and create a class of borrowers that are to some degree dependent on bank-intermediated 
loans, a requirement for the macroeconomic relevance of bank lending. The dependence 
of firms on a specific bank arises in the context of a long-term bank-borrower 
relationship, if monitoring by the relationship bank generates an informational advantage 
relative to other intermediaries.
15 
Thakor (1996) employs an asymmetric information model of bank lending to 
assess the impact of the risk-based capital requirements of the Basle Accord. In addition, 
he finds that a monetary policy expansion can lower bank lending, if it lowers the rate on 
bank deposits without changing other rates of return, such as the one on bank equity, by 
                                                      
15 Sharpe (1990) and Raghuram Rajan (1992). See Mitchell A. Petersen and Rajan (1994) for empirical 
evidence on the benefits of relationship banking for small firms. Kashyap and Stein (1994) provide a 
discussion of the issues discussed in this paragraph in relation to the bank lending channel thesis.   8
much. This result relies on holding constant the total assets of the bank; for this reason, it 
does not arise in my model. 
The rationale for capital requirements and the prudential regulation of banks in 
general has been explored extensively. Ronald M. Giammarino, Tracy R. Lewis, and 
David Sappington (1993) show that capital requirements arise naturally in the presence of 
an agency problem between the bank and a public deposit insurance system. Employing 
the incomplete contract paradigm, Mathias Dewatripont and Jean Tirole (1994) argue that 
prudential regulation in general can be viewed as a representation of small depositors, 
who due to a free rider problem cannot be expected to intervene themselves as effectively 
as large bondholders. Interestingly, Thomas Hellman, Kevin Murdock and Joseph Stiglitz 
(2000) show that, in a dynamic context, capital requirements can also have a perverse 
effect on bank incentives: by increasing the banks’ cost of funding, higher capital 
requirements lower the franchise value of the bank, which makes excessive risk-taking 
more attractive.
16 The model proposed here will show that there is a separate source of 
risk-loving behavior induced by capital requirements, which is associated not with the 
possibility of bank failure, but with regulatory interventions at the minimum capital ratio.  
 
 
II.  The Model 
 
A main feature of the model is the incorporation of capital adequacy regulations. 
Capital regulations have existed in the United States in some form since the national bank 
act of 1863.
17   The current regulatory regime was shaped primarily by the 1988 
international Basle Accord and the 1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act (FDICIA).
18   The Basle Accord established minimum capital 
requirements as ratios of two aggregates of accounting capital to risk weighted assets 
                                                      
16 Douglas Diamond and Rajan’s (2000) analysis points to a different possible cost of capital requirements: 
in their model a fragile bank capital structure improves the bank’s ability to create liquidity. 
17 For concreteness, this discussion focuses on the U.S. The Basle Accord was signed by all G-10 countries, 
although there is some variation in how strict the guidelines are implemented. The Basle framework has 
also been adopted by an increasing number of developing countries, often with interesting modifications. 
Arguably, the imperfections in the market for bank equity that make capital requirements relevant are even 
more important in developing economies. 
18 The following is based on Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller (1997), especially chapter 3E, 
Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), Joseph F. Sinkey (1998) and Raj Aggrarwal and Kevin Jacques (1998). 
These references contain more detailed information about the Basle Accord and the FDICIA.   9
(and certain off-balance sheet activities). The risk weights are supposed to reflect credit 
risk. For example, commercial and industrial loans have weight one, while U.S. 
government bonds have zero weight, and consequently do not require any regulatory 
capital. Primary or tier 1 capital is required to exceed 4 percent of risk weighted assets, 
while total (tier 1 plus tier 2) capital must be at least 8 percent.
19 The FDICIA prohibits 
insured banks from making any capital distributions, including dividends, which would 
have the effect of leaving the institution undercapitalized. In addition, the FDICIA’s 
Prompt Corrective Action provision mandates specific interventions by bank regulators 
when banks fall short of their capital requirements. These include the need to submit and 
implement a capital restoration plan, limits on asset growth, and restrictions on new lines 
of business, as well as more stringent restrictions for successively higher degrees of 
undercapitalization. Banks that have less than 2 percent tangible capital are deemed 
‘critically undercapitalized’ and face receivership within 90 days.
20 
  Another principal assumption of the model is that the bank cannot readily issue 
new equity. Some such assumption is necessary if the bank is to hold any prudential 
capital above the regulatory minimum and we are to examine the possible dependence of 
the bank’s lending decisions on its capital position. If banks were always able to 
costlessly raise new equity, no bank would ever forgo profitable lending opportunities 
and the capital requirements would be irrelevant except insofar as equity has a higher 
required rate of return. There is a sizable theoretical (e.g. Stuart C. Myers and Nicholas S. 
Majluf (1984), and Stein (1998) for banks) and empirical literature (e.g. Charles W. 
Calomiris and Hubbard (1995), and Marcia M. Cornett and Hassan Tehranian (1994) for 
banks) to support the assumption that issuing new equity can be quite costly.  As a 
starting point we compare the two polar cases where this cost is either zero or infinite. In 
case of infinite cost the model bank is unable to issue any new equity. Equity capital is 
                                                      
19 Tier 1 capital consists of common stockholders’ equity plus noncumulative perpetual preferred stock and 
any related surplus plus minority interest in the equity accounts of consolidated subsidiaries less goodwill 
and other intangibles. Tier 2 capital consists of the allowance for loan lease losses, cumulative perpetual, 
long-term and convertible preferred stock; perpetual debt and other hybrid debt/equity instruments; 
intermediate term preferred stock and term subordinated debt. In addition to the risk-based capital 
requirements, U.S. banks are also required to meet a leverage ratio requirement of 4%. The leverage ratio is 
tier 1 capital divided by average assets. 
20 Tangible capital is tier 1 capital plus cumulative preferred stock and related surplus less intangibles 
except qualifying purchased-mortgage-servicing rights. The tangible capital ratio is calculated by dividing 
by total assets less intangibles except qualifying purchased-mortgage-servicing rights.   10
still endogenous, though, since it reflects retained earnings. The bank has some control 
over it through the choice of dividends. 
  However, the bank’s inability to issue new equity is not a sufficient assumption 
for capital regulations to materially influence the bank’s real decisions. The bank could 
simply retain its earnings until its assets are only financed by capital, making it unlikely 
that the bank will ever encounter a series of bad shocks sufficient to wipe out its capital. 
Banks do not in fact hold such extreme levels of prudential capital. The reason is that 
equity capital, even when obtained through retained earning, is considered a relatively 
expensive form of funding. There are a number of reasons for the cost disadvantage of 
equity, including agency costs, but also, and more mundanely, the tax advantage of 
debt.
21 The latter feature is present in the model. It is assumed that accounting profits are 
taxed at a constant rate τ > 0. 
  Banking theory recognizes as one of the main functions of banks “the 
transformation of securities with short maturities, offered to depositors, into securities 
with long maturities that borrowers desire.” (Freixas and Rochet (1997), p. 5). The model 
bank is assumed to perform this maturity transformation. The resultant maturity 
mismatch on the balance sheet exposes the bank to interest rate risk. For example, if the 
interest rate rises unexpectedly, the bank’s interest costs will rise faster than its interest 
revenue, resulting in a profits squeeze. In addition, compared to other firms, banks are 
highly leveraged, so that a given size profits shock results in a larger percentage change 
in equity. This exposure to interest rate risk will play a crucial role in shaping the 
dynamics of bank lending in response to a monetary policy shock. The evidence from 
bank stock return generally supports the view that banks are exposed to interest rate risk. 
Mark J. Flannery and Christopher M. James (1984), Pierre Yourougou (1990) and Sung 
C. Bae (1990) all find a significant negative effect of interest rate innovations on bank 
stock returns that is not captured by a broad stock market index. In addition, across 
banks, this sensitivity is positively related to measures of the bank’s maturity or duration 
gap (Flannery and James (1984), Srinivas Akella and Stuart Greenbaum (1992)). 
                                                      
21 There are also some bank-specific considerations regarding the relative cost of debt finance, such as 
deposit insurance and reserve requirements. These considerations are taken up below. The bank’s 
shareholders may also demand a risk premium, but this is not, in a Modigliani-Miller world, a factor in 
limiting the desired level of capital, as the risk premium declines with lower leverage (MM proposition II).    11
Moreover, Kenneth J. Robinson (1995) and Steven R. Grenadier and Brian Hall (1995) 
present evidence that banks’ interest rate risk may have increased since the 




The bank’s objective is to maximize shareholder value by making loans and 
investing in tradable securities. These assets are financed by equity capital and debt 
instruments, such as time and demand deposits, bonds, etc. The bank’s balance sheet at 
the beginning of period t is given below: 
 
Assets    Liabilities   
Loans  Lt  Debt (including deposits)  Bt 
Securities  St  Equity  Et     
Total Assets  At    At 
 
I now discuss the assumptions regarding each of the components of the balance sheet. 
 
  Loans: At the beginning of each period the bank makes Nt new loans to its clients. 
The model abstracts from the details of the maturity structure by assuming that the 
average maturity of the bank’s loan portfolio is constant. Each period a fraction δ of 
outstanding loans becomes due, so that  δ / 1  is a measure of the loan portfolio’s average 
maturity. The fact that bank loans typically have longer maturity than bank deposits can 
be captured by choosing  1 < δ . While a constant fraction of loans becomes due each 
period, actual repayments are allowed to deviate from this rate in a stochastic fashion. δt+1 
denotes the fraction of loans actually repaid at the end of period t. (The subscript t+1 is 
used to maintain the convention that variables dated t are known at the beginning of 
period t which is when time t decisions are made. Any variables realized during or at the 
end of period t are therefore dated t+1.) δt+1 may differ from δ  to allow for changes in 
                                                      
22 In spite of the excess sensitivity of bank stock returns to interest rate risk, studies by Flannery (1981 and 
1983) using accounting data do not provide evidence of a large maturity gap or a negative effect of short 
interest rates on bank profits. The more recent study by Robinson (1995) does find a significant and sizable 
effect of interest rate movements on bank profits.   12
the bank’s loan portfolio that are best modeled as beyond the control of the bank, rather 
than as part of Nt. For example, some loans could be repaid early ( δ δ > +1 t ) or the bank 
may be forced to agree to deferments for some clients ( δ δ < +1 t ). Also, new loans made 
under a loan commitment from an older contract can be captured in this way. 
Loans are a risky investment for the bank. During each period a stochastic 
fraction ωt+1 of outstanding loans Lt goes bad and must be written off by the bank. In 
addition, a stochastic fraction bt+1 of new loans Nt goes bad. (The reason for the different 
charge-off rates will be clear shortly.) In accounting terms, ωt+1Lt + bt+1Nt represents net 
charge-offs on loans and leases during period t. By causing a loss to the bank these 
charge-offs directly reduce regulatory capital.
23 
Loans thus evolve according to 
 
t t t t t t t N b L L ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 1 1 1 1 + + + + + − − + − − = δ ω δ  (1) 
 
Note that some of the new loans are assumed to become due in one period. 
The bank faces a downward sloping demand curve for its loanable funds. That is, 
the more it lends in a given period, the lower the average expected return on these loans. 
This assumption reflects either some market power on the part of the bank or convex 
screening costs. Since the focus of this model is not on the micro-foundations of bank 
lending, these factors are not modeled explicitly. The market power can be due to 
geographical specialization of the bank or an informational advantage stemming from 
long-term relations with its clients. Limited screening capacity will lead to lower average 
quality loans when the resources are spread over more candidate projects or when more 
of the screened projects are accepted. One way to model the dependence of the expected 
return on loans is through the contractual interest payments. Another is through expected 
defaults. The model accommodates both approaches. 
                                                      
23 Net charge-offs are made against the allowance for loan lease losses, which is part of tier 2 bank capital. 
If the bank decides to keep the allowance constant in the face of these charge-offs, a provision for loan 
lease losses of equal size must be made. The net result would then be that tier 2 capital is unchanged, but 
tier 1 capital is reduced by the amount of the provision, which lowers the bank’s net income. Either way, 
total capital (tier 1 plus tier 2) is reduced. A provision without a charge-off would reduce tier 1 capital but 
would have no effect on total capital. (The allowance for loan lease losses is supposed to be adequate to 
absorb expected loan and lease losses, based upon management’s evaluation of the bank’s current loan and 
lease portfolio.)    13
First, the average contractual interest rate on new loans is a decreasing function, 
ρ(Nt), of the amount of new loans made, Nt. The average contractual interest rate on all 
outstanding loans in period t,  t ρ , is then given recursively by 
 
1
1 1 1 1
1
) ( } ) 1 {( } ) 1 {(
+
+ + + +
+
− − + − −
=
t
t t t t t t t t
t L
N N b L ρ δ ρ ω δ
ρ  (2) 
with 
   0 ) (   ≤ ′ N ρ  (3) 
 















Furthermore, at least one of the inequalities in assumptions (3) and (5) must be strict. It is 
convenient to assume that ρ(N)N is a weakly concave function of N and that b(N,ω) is 
weakly convex in N. Note that bt+1 may be stochastic through its dependence on ωt+1.  
 
  Bank Debt and Securities: It is assumed that the bank’s debt liabilities B are all 
short. Since loans have maturity exceeding one, the model bank performs its traditional 
role of maturity transformation. Despite the maturity mismatch on the bank’s balance 
sheet, the model abstracts from liquidity problems on the part of the bank: the model 
bank can borrow freely at the market interest rate rt. All debt liabilities are assumed to be 
fully insured in a government run fixed rate deposit insurance scheme, which justifies the 
absence of a risk premium on the bank’s debt. For simplicity, the insurance premium is 
assumed to be zero.
24  
                                                      
24 The premium could also be lump-sum. As the model is set up, a positive premium rate would simply lead 
the bank to hold no securities given that there are no liquidity problems. In reality, the premium is positive 
but very low and banks do generally hold securities, in part for liquidity management.   14
  In addition, the bank can invest in tradable securities S, yielding the same riskless 
return rt. Because the bank has perfect access to both markets, its securities and debt level 
are indeterminate; only net debt B – S is determined.
25 For this reason, without loss of 
generality, S is simply set equal to zero hereafter. The abstraction from liquidity problems 
makes the role of capital explicit. It is not argued that liquidity management is an 
unimportant consideration for banks. A few comments about these assumptions are in 
order. 
  First, there is no special role for reservable and/or demand deposits in the model. 
This is an unusual assumption from the viewpoint of banking and monetary theory. 
However, as long as the bank can borrow and lend freely at the market interest rate r, 
then this rate is the relevant margin for the lending decision. Even if the bank can attract 
some deposits at lower cost, as is often assumed, this cannot be the marginal source of 
funding – the bank would always want to take all the below-market rate deposits it can 
get and put them in securities. This would simply add an amount to the bank’s profits 
determined only by the size and profitability of the bank’s market for deposits. Of course, 
to the extent that these 'cheap' deposits are subject to reserve requirements, the interest 
forgone on the reserves should be deducted from this amount. In the model this 
component of profits is simply held constant.
26 Second, the same logic suggests that the 
assumption that all bank debt is fully insured is an immaterial simplification, if the bank 
can at the margin obtain insured deposits at market rates. The point is that the market 
interest rate is the relevant margin for lending decisions as long as the bank has access to 
some nonreservable and risk-free (insured) debt liability and can trade in risk-free 
securities. 
  The assumption of perfect access to insured and nonreservable deposits contrasts 
strongly with a precondition for the existence of a bank lending channel: the inability of 
                                                      
25 As will be explained below, neither B nor S enter the risk-based capital requirement. 
26 Suppose the bank funds itself in part with deposits M with a below market return. Let the required return 
on M, plus any transaction, reserves, and deposit insurance costs, be i = r – φ < r. Obviously, M cannot be 
chosen without limit, otherwise M = ∞ and  i would be the market rate. Assuming securities are the closest 
substitutes to M for consumers/firms, write M = M(φ). Then the component in the bank’s profits from the 
rent on M is  ) (ϕ ϕ π M
M = . If φ is constant, or subject to choice by the bank, then π
M is also constant. If φ 
increases with r, as is the case if i = 0 for example, then  r
M ∂ ∂ / π < (>) 0, if the elasticity 
1   ) ( / ) / ( < > ∂ ∂ − ϕ ϕ M M .   15
banks to shield their loan supply from shocks to reserves.
27 Thus, the model takes head 
on the critique by Romer and Romer (1990), among others, of the bank lending channel, 
that the bank’s lending decisions should not depend on shocks to reserves as long as 
banks have perfect access to nonreservable liabilities. This is true in my model, but there 
is a different channel working through bank capital.  
 
Equity: The accounting value of equity, or capital, is a residual: Et = Lt – Bt. 
Equity evolves according to: 
 
1 1 ) 1 ( + + − + − = t t t t D E E π τ  (6) 
 
where Dt denotes dividends paid out to shareholders at the beginning of period t and πt+1 
is pre-tax accounting profits made during period t. (Again, the subscript t+1 is used 
because the profits are not known at the beginning of the period t.) Dividends are a 
decision variable for the bank. Banks are constrained from issuing new equity; if they 
could issue new equity, Dt would be negative and (–Dt) would represent the value of 
newly issued equity. It is assumed that accounting profits are the same for regulatory and 
tax purposes and that they are taxed at the constant rate τ. Using the balance sheet identity 
t t t E L B − ≡  to simplify, accounting profits are given by: 
 
F
t t t t
t t t t t t t t t t t t
N b L
D N E L r N b N L
π ω
ρ ω ρ π
+ + −




) ( ) 1 )( ( ) 1 (
1 1
1 1 1  (7) 
 
The first two terms represent the interest income from loans, including new loans, during 
period t. Recall that ωt+1 (bt+1) is the fraction of loans (new loans) that goes bad during 
period  t. The third term is the interest payment on the bank’s debt. New loans and 
dividends increase the bank's demand for nonequity funding. The fourth term represents 
the net charge-offs on loans (see footnote 23 above). Finally, the constant term π
F 
represents any other components of profits, such as fixed operating costs and, possibly, 
rents on intra-marginal deposits. 
                                                      
27 See, for example, Kashyap and Stein (1994) and Bernanke and Blinder (1988). Stein (1998) provides a 
micro-founded model of the bank lending channel in which some banks are dependent on insured and   16
  It is useful to see what the bank’s balance sheet looks like after accounting for its 
decisions on new loans and dividends, but prior to defaults and repayments. For 
comparability, we momentarily forget the S = 0 normalization. 
 
Assets    Liabilities   
Loans  Lt + Nt  Debt  Bt + Nt +ΔSt + Dt 
Securities  St +ΔSt  Equity  Et – Dt  
Total Assets  At + Nt + ΔSt    At + Nt + ΔSt 
 
  For completeness, we now also state the law of motion for bank debt: 
 
() () t t t t
F
t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t
N b L N b N L
N L D N B r B
1 1 1 1
1 1
) 1 )( ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (    
) ( ) )( ) 1 ( 1 (
+ + + +
+ +
+ − + − + − − −
+ − + + − + =




The tax advantage of debt is apparent from the (1-τ) factor by which the interest costs are 
discounted. The remaining terms reflect the repayments, after-tax interest income and the 
tax deduction from the charge-offs on loans, in that order.
28 
 
  Capital Regulation: At the beginning of each period capital requirements are 
enforced by the regulatory authorities. In calculating the risk weighted capital asset ratio 
all loans are assumed to be in the highest risk category in the sense of the Basle Accord, 
with a risk weight of 100%. This category includes all claims to the non-bank private 
sector, except for mortgages on residential property, which receive a risk weight of 50%. 
The riskless securities are in the lowest risk category, with weight zero. Typical examples 
are Treasury bills and short loans to other depository institutions. Note that, given the 
assumptions of the model, the bank would never hold securities with a positive risk 
weight unless they yield an above market return. Thus, for the model bank, the risk-
adjusted capital asset ratio (RACAR) at the beginning of the period is equal to  tt E L . 
                                                                                                                                                              
reservable deposits, and thus on reserves, for financing loans. 
28 One can derive this equation by taking bank debt at the beginning of period t, after making new loans and 
dividends, and subtracting after-tax net cash-flow during period t. Combined with the balance sheet identity 
and (6), the definition of accounting profits (7) can then be derived.   17
  The capital adequacy regulations place restrictions on the bank’s activities as soon 
as this ratio falls below the regulatory minimum γ. In the Basle Accord, γ is equal to 0.04 
for tier 1 capital and 0.08 for total capital. In view of the discussion above, these 
restrictions are modeled in the following way: When at the beginning of the period t the 
RACAR exceeds the regulatory minimum, the bank is free to pay dividends and invest in 
new loans, as long as these actions do not have the immediate consequence of pushing 
the RACAR below γ. Put more succinctly, 
 
) (   t t t t t t N L D E L E + ≥ − ⇒ ≥ γ γ  (8) 
 
If at the beginning of the period the bank is already undercapitalized, then the regulator 
prevents the bank from paying out any dividends or making any new loans: 
 
0   and   0 = = ⇒ < t t t t D N L E γ  (9) 
 
The prohibition of dividends can be found directly in the FDICIA, while the no new loans 
restriction captures the imposed limits on asset growth. The main cost of 
undercapitalization to the bank is thus that it must forgo profitable lending opportunities. 
 
  Financial Constraint: As discussed, the bank is unable to issue new equity. This 
implies that dividends are constrained to be nonnegative: 
 
0 ≥ t D  (10) 
 
  Finally, it is assumed that shareholders do not price the risk of the bank’s shares. 
(Alternatively, we could assume that the entire analysis is conducted under the risk 
neutral probability measure of the arbitrage-free economy.) The market value of the 
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The maximization in (11) is subject to the laws of motion in (1), (2), (4), (6) and (7), the 
regulatory constraints (8) and (9) and the financial constraint (10), as well as an initial 
balance sheet position, as given above.
29 The bank takes the stochastic processes of rt, δt 
and ωt as given. It is convenient to make some technical assumptions with regard to these 
processes. 
 
  Exogenous shocks:  rt,  δt  and  ωt follow a joint Markov process with bounded 
support. Moreover, the time t conditional distribution of (rt+1,δt+1,ωt+1) depends on time t 
information only through rt according to a density  11 1 (, , ; ) tt t t Fr r δ ω ++ + . It is also assumed 
that F is continuous with respect to its second and third argument.  
 
  The Markov assumption allows the maximization problem in (11) to be 
formulated as a dynamic programming problem. Assuming that all rt is a sufficient 
statistic for the time t conditional distribution of (rt+1,δt+1,ωt+1) avoids having to include 
the shocks δt and ωt in the vector of state variables. The vector  ) , , , ( t t t t r L E ρ  is thus a 
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ρ ρ  (12) 
 s.t.  (1), (2), (4), (6), (7), (8), (9) and (10) 
 
  For comparison, it is useful to consider what the bank’s optimal policy would be, 
if it faced no financial constraint, but could raise new equity without cost at the beginning 
of each period. With Dt denoting net dividends, i.e., gross dividends minus the value of 
newly issued equity, we do not need to modify the law of motion for capital, (6). 
(Obviously, net dividends are the same as dividends for the bank that is unable to issue 
any new equity.) Also, the expression in (11) then defines the bank’s pre-issue 
shareholder value. Thus, it remains the appropriate objective function for the 
unconstrained bank as it represents the interests of the existing shareholders when the 
                                                      
29 I adopt the convention that  1 = Π = t
b
a t x  whenever b<a.   19
time  t  decisions are taken.
30 Let  V
U define the value function for this ‘financially 
unconstrained’ problem. With Dt denoting net dividends, the Bellman equation for V
U 
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s.t. (1), (2), (4), (6), (7), and  
) (   t t t t N L D E + ≥ − γ   
 
The regulatory constraint has been altered since the bank can now always maintain the 
minimum risk adjusted capital adequacy ratio by issuing new equity. 
Even though equity is still more costly due to the tax effect, the absence of the 
financial constraint leads to a decoupling of the bank’s lending decision from its financial 
position. New loans depend only on the lending opportunities and the cost of funding. 
Essentially, the Modigliani-Miller theorem now applies in the sense that lending is 
independent of the bank’s capital structure at the beginning of the period. The following 
proposition formalizes these statements. Let  ) , , , ( t t t t t r L E s ρ ≡  denote the vector of states 
and let N
U(st) and D
U(st) be the optimal policy functions associated with the 
unconstrained problem in (13). Then the following proposition applies. 
 
Proposition 1: The unconstrained bank’s lending decisions are a function of the path of 
interest rates only: N
U(st) = N
U(rt), where N
U( ) is a time-invariant function. Furthermore, 
the bank’s optimal financial policy is to keep the risk adjusted capital ratio exactly at the 
regulatory minimum:  )) ( N ( ) (
U
t t t t
U r L E s D + − = γ . Finally, the unconstrained bank’s 
value function is of the following form: 
 
  ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , , , ( 0 t t t t L t t L t t t t t
U r a L r a L r a E r L E V + + + = ρ ρ ρ  
 
Proof: see Appendix A.  
                                                      
30 Formulating the problem in terms of choosing net dividends alone economizes on notation. Given the 
model assumptions it is easy to see that optimal gross dividends and new equity issues are indeterminate for 
the ‘financially unconstrained’ bank. Only the difference, Dt, is determined in the maximization.   20
 
While the capital regulation does affect the after-tax cost of funding for new loans, which 
is equal to (1-γ)(1-τ)rt + γ rt, the financial position of the bank at the beginning of the 
period is irrelevant to its lending decision, because the bank can always raise sufficient 
funds to finance profitable lending opportunities. For the same reason, there is no need 
for the bank to hold a costly precautionary buffer of capital above the regulatory 
minimum.  
  A bank that faces the financial constraint is able to lend N
U(rt), the optimal level 
for a financially unconstrained bank, only if it starts the period with sufficient capital, that 
is, only if  )) ( N (
U
t t t r L E + ≥γ . Suppose the bank were to attempt to keep its lending 
equal to its unconstrained counterpart. It could achieve this only by maintaining a high 
buffer of prudential capital through retained earnings. That is, it would have to leave 
1 1 − − − t t D E  sufficiently high to ensure that  )) ( N (
U
t t t r L E + ≥γ  for all realizations of rt, δt 
and ωt. While this may be feasible, holding the additional equity is costly due to the 
unfavorable tax treatment of equity funding. The bank will trade off the benefit of 
holding more equity (a smaller likelihood that the financial constraint will bind and limit 
lending) against the tax disadvantage. The optimal trade-off involves a positive 
probability of being financially constrained, because at Nt = N
U(rt) a marginal reduction 
in lending has no effect on the value of the bank’s equity. The following proposition 
formalizes this. The condition  0 ] 0 ) ( Pr[ > < t
U s D  simply states that the bank’s problem 
is sufficiently challenging so that an unconstrained bank, which does not keep any excess 
capital, will sometimes want to issue new equity. 
 
Proposition 2: Suppose  0 ] 0 ) ( Pr[ > < t
U s D . Then a bank that faces the financial 
constraint will in some periods deviate from the unconstrained optimal level of lending, 
even when it is feasible for the bank to always lend at this level. That is, for all  0 s , 




t r s N s N = ≠  for some t. 
Proof: see Appendix B. 
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It may seem surprising that we cannot prove a stronger proposition, namely that the 
financially constrained bank will also always lend weakly less ( ) ( N ) (
U
t t r s N ≤  for all t), 
but that is because it is not true, as we will see. 
 
 
III.  Calibration and Solution Methods 
 
The size of the bank is implicitly determined by the bank’s loan demand functions 
b(N,ω) and ρ(N). Computations of versions with a strictly downward sloping ρ( ) function 
resulted in only  very minimal variation in the average contractual interest rate,  t ρ , 
reflecting the longer maturity of loans. In light of this, I proceed with a constant 
contractual interest rate, ρ
0, so that the bank’s market power (or limited screening 
capacity) is completely captured through charge-offs b(N,ω). The advantage of this 
approach is that it reduces the number of states by one. This greatly reduces the 
computational burden. It should be stressed that even though ρ is fixed, the expected 
return on bank loans net of charge-offs is variable and will respond endogenously to the 
market rate r. 
 
A.  Calibration 
The model is calibrated for a quarterly time period.  Table 1 gives some key 
parameter values. The required risk adjusted capital asset ratio, γ, is set to 0.08, the 
relevant value for total capital. The corporate income tax τ is 0.4. The interest rate is 
assumed to have finite support. This makes exact integration with respect to this shock 
possible. As a starting point, we allow r to have four values, ranging from 0.04 to 0.07 
annually, as given in table 1.2 (top row). The interest rate r thus follows a Markov 
process in a finite space with transition probabilities as given in the table. The values 
chosen imply a quarterly autocorrelation of 0.9, which is close to the empirical value for 
the Federal funds rate.  
To separate the monetary policy effects most clearly the charge-off rate, ω, and 
loan repayments, δ, are assumed to be independent of the interest rate r. Without this 
assumption, movements in lending would partly reflect shifts in loan demand. Each of the 
two shocks has a tent-shaped density, with minimum, mode and maximum as given in   22
table 1.1, again expressed at annual rates. The continuity assumption requires that the 
densities are zero at the minimum and maximum of the support.
31 The mean of the net 
charge-off rate ω is 1.3% annually, which is close to the historic average for commercial 
and industrial and consumer loans.
32 The average maturity of loans ( δ / 1 ) is set at four 
years. According to David M. Wright and James V. Houpt (1996), for the median 
commercial bank in 1995, the proportion of bank assets maturing or repricing in more 
than five years is 0.1. Since in the model all securities are short, and taking a loans-to-
assets ratio of 0.6 (Allan N. Berger et al., 1995), this would imply a value of  3 . 0 = δ , 
slightly higher than the value used here. 
Given the processes of r, ω and δ, the value of the contractual interest rate, ρ
0, 
must be set sufficiently high to ensure that some lending is profitable for all values of r. 
The value chosen of 0.08 per annum accomplishes this. I assume the following functional 
form for b(N,ω): 
 
ω α ω
η N N = ) , b(  
 
The parameter α normalizes the bank’s size. The values of ρ
0 and η jointly determine the 
slope of the bank’s loan demand curve. At the chosen values, the elasticity of loan 
demand with respect to the market interest rate, measured as  ( ) r N N r
U U ∂ ∂ − , is 
approximately unity for permanent changes in the short rate r, and 0.4 for changes of the 
calibrated persistence. With this loan demand curve, the response of loans to interest rate 
shocks turns out to be order-of-magnitude comparable to the response of loans in 
identified VARs to a monetary policy shock that moves the Federal funds rate by the 
same amount.
33 
                                                      
31 Net charge-offs can be negative if recoveries on loans exceed gross charge-offs. 
32 Residential mortgages have historically had much lower charge-off rates in the U.S. (about 0.1% for 1-4 
family homes). Consequently, they have been placed in a lower risk category. Commercial real estate loans 
are more risky, with a 1.7% average charge-off rate, compared to 1.1% for C&I loans and 1.3% for 
consumer loans (Grenadier and Hall (1995), 1976-1993 data). 
33 I do not argue that the model impulse response functions should match the VAR results with a high 
degree of precision. The VAR responses reflect in part shifts in loan demand due to changes in economic 
activity following a monetary shock, whereas in the model the loan demand curve is held fixed to isolate 
the supply effect. If loan demand depends positively on economic activity, then the model should produce 
somewhat smaller responses of loans to a given change in the Funds rate than identified VARs. (While 
loans are procyclical, there is a caveat: the empirical evidence from the commercial paper market 
(Kashyap, Stein, and David D. Wilcox (1993)) and lending under commitment (Donald P. Morgan (1998))   23
  Finally, the value of π
F, the fixed component of bank profits, is set to ensure that 
the bank’s problem is sufficiently challenging to be interesting, while ensuring that the 
market-to-book-value ratio of the bank’s equity, q = V/E, is above one most of the time. 
(In the simulations, the mean average q is 1.16). 
  Since there are only two endogenous states left, the value function reduces to the 
form: ) ( ) ( ) , , ( 0 t t t L t t t t
U r a L r a E r L E V + + = . The numerical values of aL and a0 are given 
in table 2, as is the policy function for new loans of the financially unconstrained bank. 
At the highest level of lending (N = 0.9) the marginal new loan is expected to have 5% 
more charged off over its lifetime than the marginal loan at N = 0. 
 
B.  Solution Methods   
  A value iteration method is used to obtain an approximate solution to the bank’s 
problem. Because the effect of bank capital on lending is expected to be highly nonlinear, 
linearization techniques are undesirable for solving this model. The algorithm employs 
modified policy iteration on a finite grid. The problem is not discretized, however. The 
choice variables remain continuous and simplicial interpolation is used to evaluate the 
value function at non-grid points. The grid is denser around E = γL as the value function 
is highly nonlinear in this area. The initial guess for the value function is V
U, which is 
easily solved for using proposition 1. Appendix C provides additional computational 
details. The results presented are computed using a grid with 28,800 points. 
 
 
IV.  Results 
 
  Before delving into a detailed discussion of the results, table 3 gives some key 
moments from the simulation of the solved model. Histograms of key variables can be 
                                                                                                                                                              
suggests that that the demand for credit may well increase initially in response to a contractionary monetary 
policy shock, reflecting a buildup of inventories.) For what it’s worth, Bernanke and Blinder’s (1992) 
results imply that a monetary policy shock that increases the Funds rate by one percentage point produces a 
1.9 (4.4) percent decline in bank loans at a one (two) year horizon, compared to 1.6 (2.5) percent in the 
model. While identified VARs usually produce a more transitory movement in the Funds rate following a 
monetary policy shocks than the model’s interest rate process, the 18 variable VAR of Eric M. Leeper, 
Christopher A. Sims and Tao Zha (1996) shows that a monetary policy shock with roughly the same 
persistence as the model’s produces nearly the same effect on bank loans during the first two years as the 
more transitory shock.    24
found in figure 1. The tables and graphs refer to excess capital, which is defined as equity 
capital minus the regulatory minimum. Beginning of period excess capital, Zt, is given by 
 
  t t t L E Z γ − ≡  
 
After the new lending and dividends decisions have been made, excess capital reduces to 
 () ttt tt Z ED LN γ ′ ≡−− + . It is noted that the bank violates capital adequacy regulations 
about 0.43 percent of the periods, while bankruptcy occurs only about 0.02 percent of the 
time. (In 1993, the year following the full implementation of the FDICIA, 0.26 percent of 
bank assets was in undercapitalized banks, while 0.03 percent was in critically 
undercapitalized banks.) 
The remainder of this section characterizes the value function and policy function 
of the model bank. The next sections will analyze the bank's response to monetary and 
loan default shocks. 
 
A.  The Value Function 
  Figure 2 depicts the values of the constrained and unconstrained
34 banks  as 
functions of excess equity capital and for two different levels of the interest rate. In the 
figure L is held constant at its average value (11.5). The range of excess capital in the 
graph represents 98% of the simulated values of Z. As predicted by proposition 1, the 
value function of the unconstrained bank is linear in equity with slope equal to 1. For a 
given interest rate, the constrained bank’s value function lies below the unconstrained 
bank’s and is nonlinear in equity. The nonlinearity is more clearly displayed in the 
bottom panel of the figure, which shows the marginal value of equity,  t t E s V ∂ ∂ ) (,  a t  t h e  
same levels of excess capital. As can be seen from the discontinuity, the value function V 
contains a kink at Z = 0, the point at which beginning of period equity capital is exactly 
equal to the regulatory minimum. At this point the bank is unable to make any new loans, 
as both the regulatory and the financial constraints are binding. The kink arises because at 
                                                      
34 Throughout the paper I use the phrase ‘constrained bank’ for a bank that faces the financial constraint 
(10), whether that constraint is currently binding or not. The value function of this bank is denoted V and is 
defined in (12). The phrase ‘unconstrained bank’ refers to the bank’s problem without the financial 
constraint. Its value function is given by V
U as defined in (13).   25
this point a marginal increase in equity allows the bank to take on the most profitable 
lending opportunities, which accounts for the higher right derivative. The left derivative 
is lower because a decrease in equity at Z = 0 does not change the bank’s policy. (The 
regulator does not force the bank to liquidate its loans when capital is inadequate, as long 
as equity remains positive.) 
  As equity is increased from the regulatory minimum, its marginal value drops 
gradually to 1. The reason for this is that, with equity close to the regulatory minimum, 
both the financial and regulatory constraints are binding so that a marginal addition to 
equity allows the bank to undertake two potentially value increasing actions. First, an 
additional dollar of equity allows the bank to invest 1/γ dollars more in new loans. The 
bank selects the most profitable lending opportunities first, but as new lending increases, 
the marginal profitability of new loans declines (assumptions (3) and (5)), so that 
marginal value of equity declines as well in this region. At the lower market interest rate 
lending is more profitable, which results in a higher marginal value of equity for small 
but positive excess capital. 
The second reason why the marginal value of equity can be higher than 1 for low 
but positive values of excess capital stems from the desire of the bank to guard against 
the risk of facing a binding financial constraint next period, which can lead it to hold 
capital in excess of the regulatory minimum this period, as will be shown in the 
discussion of the policy function below.  
At a sufficiently high level of excess capital, the bank will have exhausted all 
profitable lending opportunities and retained the optimal amount of excess capital, and at 
this point all remaining excess capital is paid out to shareholders as dividend. It is 
immediate from the Bellman equation that, if dividends are strictly positive, the marginal 
value of equity is equal to one. 
The nonlinearity of the value function has interesting consequences for the bank’s 
derived preferences toward risk. While the unconstrained bank is risk-neutral, the 
constrained bank’s value function’s curvature has both risk-averse and risk-loving 
characteristics. The decreasing marginal value of equity at positive but below-average 
levels of excess capital implies that the bank is locally risk averse with respect to small 
equity gambles in this region. Around Z = 0, however, the bank is risk-loving, due to the   26
kink in the value function. As explained, the source of the kink and the induced 
preference for risk is due to the nature of the capital regulation. It has nothing to do with 
the deposit insurance or any ‘gamble-for-resurrection’ phenomenon associated with 
bankruptcy.  
  Figure 3 shows the difference between the bank’s value and the value of its 
unconstrained counterpart ( ) ( ) ( s V s V
U − ) as a function of the endogenous state variables, 
excess capital and loans. The range of loans represents 98% of the simulated values. The 
figure shows the negative of how much a constrained bank would be willing to pay to 
have its financial constraint lifted permanently, depending on its balance sheet. Higher 
values thus correspond to lower expected cost of capital inadequacy.
35 (This presentation 
yields the clearest view of the nonlinearity of V.)While the bank value is lowered by the 
financial constraint everywhere, the cost is highest for banks with low levels of capital 
and low outstanding loans. The magnitude of the cost is economically significant, but not 
extremely large. For example, a bank with average book values of loans and equity (11.5 
and 1.01, respectively) has expected capital inadequacy costs ranging from 0.013 for r = 
0.04 to 0.019 for r = 0.07, which is about 1 to 2% of the bank’s market value of equity at 
these interest rates. In contrast, an undercapitalized bank with excess capital of –0.01, but 




B.  The Policy Function 
  Figure 4 depicts the bank’s optimal policies as a function of excess capital, again 
given an average loan portfolio. Both new loans N (scaled by γ = 0.08) and dividends D 
are shown, at two levels of the interest rate: r1 = 0.05 and r2 = 0.06. The third variable 
shown is Z’, the slack in the regulatory constraint (8): 
                                                      
35 To be precise, these costs include both the loss due to forgone lending opportunities and the tax cost of 
holding of excess capital, which the bank holds to limit this loss.  
36 Note that figure 3 also fully documents the nonlinearity V in E and L, since V
U is linear in these states. In 
addition to the results already discussed, it can be seen that, for a given level of excess capital, both the 
marginal value of equity and the marginal value of loans are higher when the amount of outstanding loans 
is low. The reason for this is that loans are profitable, reflecting the bank’s market power, so that with 
fewer loans outstanding, the bank’s expected profits are lower (even as fraction of loans outstanding, due to 
the presence of fixed operating costs). Other things equal, this implies a greater likelihood that the financial 
constraint will be binding in the future.   27
 
  t t t t t t t t N D Z N L D E Z γ γ − − ≡ + − − ≡ ′ ) (   
 
Although Z’ is obviously not an independent decision variable, given N and D, it is useful 
to include it in the discussion of the bank’s optimal policy.  
For a bank with high levels of excess capital at the beginning of the period, the 
bank’s decisions resemble those of its unconstrained counterpart. For an abundantly 
capitalized bank new lending is unaffected by (small) changes in equity which only affect 
dividends. The main difference is that, while the financially unconstrained bank 
maintains no excess capital after the new loans and dividends have been paid out, an 
adequately capitalized bank that faces a financial constraint will in general decide to 
maintain a buffer of excess capital to lower the expected cost of future capital 
inadequacy. In this case the regulatory constraint (8) is slack and Z’ is strictly positive.
37 
It is not surprising that new loans depend negatively on the short interest rate. This is a 
straightforward cost-of-funding effect, which occurs for a financially unconstrained bank 
as well. 
  At lower levels of excess capital the financial constraint binds first. Dividends are 
zero and the bank responds to further reductions in equity capital by both lowering the 
buffer of excess capital Z’ and, to a lesser extent, by cutting new lending. Although the 
effect is not very strong for a bank with average loans, the bank cuts new lending in 
response to a negative capital shock even when the regulatory constraint is slack, so that 
it is still feasible for the bank to isolate its lending decisions from the capital shock. In 
doing so, the bank forgoes profitable lending opportunities now in order to lower the risk 
that capital inadequacy will force it to forgo even more profitable lending opportunities in 
the future. Figure 5a, which displays the lending decision as a function of both excess 
capital and outstanding loans, shows that this precautionary reduction in lending is much 
stronger when loans are low or the short rate is high. The reason is that expected profits 
are lower in those conditions, so the bank values a greater buffer stock of excess capital 
more. (The dividend graphs in figure 5b confirm that no dividends are paid out in the 
regions of reduced lending). The precautionary reduction in new lending is especially   28
strong when the short interest rate is at its highest level. New lending actually falls to 
zero for a moderately capitalized bank with low loans. This reflects not only low 
expected profits, but also the fact that, at this high interest rate, r is expected to decrease, 
so that lending is likely to be more profitable in the future. Conditional on the regulatory 
constraint being slack, a precautionary cut in N occurs about 40% of the time and the 
mean cut is 5.6%. 
  As equity is lowered even further toward the regulatory minimum, the regulatory 
constraint eventually becomes binding (Z’ = 0). This situation occurs about 19 percent of 
the periods in the simulation. With the financial constraint already binding, a unit 
reduction in equity results in a 1/γ ( = 12.5) unit reduction in lending. The bank’s 
behavior is also radically different with respect to interest rate shocks: these have no 
effect within the period. 
  There is one surprising aspect of the bank’s lending decisions that is not apparent 
from these figures: the financially constrained bank often lends more than its 
unconstrained counterpart with the same state (or any other state with the same short 
interest rate). Table 4 gives the distribution this ‘overlending’, defined as: 
) ( N / )) ( N ) ( ( ) (
U U
t t t t r r s N s n − ≡ , which is attributable to the financial constraint.
38 As 
can be seen, both negative and positive values of n occur. The (sometimes large) negative 
values, i.e. ‘underlending’, are not surprising in light of the above discussion. Indeed, 
similar ‘underinvestment’ results are a common feature of models of investment with 
financial frictions. The fact that the constrained bank will often lend more may seem 
more puzzling, however. Almost one quarter of the time the bank will overlend by more 
than a percentage point. While the effect is not very large, it is not economically 
insignificant either.
39 
What causes this phenomenon? How can loans that are not profitable to the 
unconstrained bank be profitable to a bank that faces a financial constraint? It turns out to 
be caused by the interaction between the financial constraint, the capital requirement and 
                                                                                                                                                              
37 One other difference is that even a well-capitalized bank does not in general lend at exactly the same 
level as its unconstrained counterpart:  ) ( N
U r N ≠ . This is discussed in more detail below. 
38 Due to the tax distortion overlending is not necessarily sub-optimal.   29
the corporate income tax. While a more formal analysis can be found in Appendix D, the 
key reason is that the financial imperfection motivates the bank to hold costly equity in 
excess of the regulatory minimum most of the time (i.e. the regulatory constraint is 
slack). In contrast, its unconstrained counterpart always has a binding capital 
requirement. It keeps its equity at the regulatory minimum because the corporate income 
tax implies that equity is a more costly source of funds (see proposition 1). This means 
that on average loans by the financially constrained bank are funded in a more costly 
way. However, this need not be true at the margin. A bank that is already holding a 
buffer of excess capital can choose to fund an additional loan by less than a fraction γ in 
equity. This does not necessarily have an adverse impact on the distribution of future 
excess capital – which is what the bank cares about when the current constraint is slack – 
because the future capital requirement associated with the new loans will be less than γN, 




V.  Monetary Policy Effects 
 
  Monetary policy actions affect the bank’s behavior in the model through 
movements of the short interest rate r. This section examines the dynamic response of the 
bank’s balance sheet, lending and dividends to changes in the short rate, and how this 
response depends on the initial financial position of the bank. 
For this purpose, impulse response functions are computed that show the 
difference between the expected paths of the variables with and without the shock. Since 
the model is nonlinear, this difference depends on the state of the bank at the time the 
shock occurs. Specifically, the impulse response function of, say, new loans to an interest 
rate shock is defined as: 
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39 The reader may be concerned about computational error. The overlending is large, however, compared to 
the accuracy of the optimization and integration routines. In addition, increasing the number of grid points 
and the number of Monte-Carlo draws does not reduce the overlending phenomenon. 
40 This effect may be offset by the riskiness of loans, so that overlending does not always occur whenever 
the capital requirement is slack.   30
where  0 r Δ  is the size of the interest rate shock, referring to the period the shock occurs as 
period 0. For any given initial state, the expectation in Resx,r is computed through Monte-
Carlo integration, taking as inputs the computed policy functions and the laws of motion 
for the states. (The usual method of equating all shocks in periods t ≥ 1 to their expected 
values is not valid due to the nonlinear policy functions.) 
  Figure 6 shows the response of an ‘average’ bank to a one percentage point rise in 
the interest rate, starting from r0 = 0.05 ( ) 05 . 0 ), E( ), E( ; ( Res , L E t r x ). That is, the values 
for E0 and L0 are their unconditional means. In all impulse response diagrams the solid 
lines refer to the bank that faces a financial constraint and the dashed lines to the 
unconstrained bank. As can be seen in the figure, the unconstrained bank cuts lending in 
response to the interest rate hike. This response simply reflects the higher cost of funding 
the new loans, the conventional interest rate channel. The effect is persistent because of 
the positive serial correlation of the interest rate process. The response of the constrained 
bank’s new loans is similar. The main difference is in the paths of dividends and excess 
capital. As can be seen, the ‘average’ bank is able to adjust dividends to limit the decline 
in excess capital that follows the higher cost of funding. Consequently, the bank manages 
to maintain a path of new loans largely similar to that of the unconstrained bank. 
Nonetheless, the response of N is somewhat smaller (in absolute value) in the first 3 
quarters and larger after a year. The reason for these (small) differences will become 
clear after we discuss the reactions of a bank that starts out with lower equity. 
  Figure 7 displays the impulse response functions of a bank that starts out with a 
binding regulatory constraint. The initial level of excess capital is set at 0.05, which is 
insufficient to fund all profitable lending opportunities, regardless of the interest rate, and 
at which level the bank’s regulatory constraint is binding.  (Loans remain set at the mean 
value. The figure thus shows  ) 05 . 0 ), E( , 05 . 0 ) E( ; ( Res , L L t r x + γ .) The response of the 
unconstrained bank is the same as in the previous figure because it is independent of the 
initial states E0 and L0 due to its linear policy functions. The response of the financially 
constrained bank is markedly different, however. In the first period, with Z = 0.05, both 
the regulatory and the financial constraints are binding, so the bank cannot make any new 
loans or pay out any dividends. This is why the response of both variables is nil in period   31
0. Hence, monetary policy initially has no effect on bank lending. This possibility was 
mentioned earlier by Kashyap and Stein (1994) in their survey of monetary policy and 
bank lending. After the first quarter, however, the reverse is true: new lending 
‘overreacts’ to the contractionary monetary policy shock, relative to the financially 
unconstrained bank. This result is the combined effect of two forces. First, there is a 
positive probability that the bank will recover its equity position sufficiently so that the 
regulatory constraint is no longer binding. Conditional on this situation materializing, the 
response of N is approximately the same as that of the unconstrained bank. Thus, this first 
effect alone can at most generate a response that equals the unconstrained response. 
Second, the interest rate rise lowers the probability of such a recovery. Because of the 
maturity mismatch on the bank’s balance sheet, the rise in the short rate increases the 
bank’s interest cost by more than it increases its interest revenues. Consequently, profits 
are expected to be lower, which implies a lower probability of a recovery. The bank must 
rely on profits to rebuild its capital due to the inability of the bank to raise new equity.  
The second mechanism can be referred to as a ‘bank capital channel’ of monetary 
policy. The rise of the short interest rate lowers future bank capital, which on average 
reduces bank lending. It is this channel that accounts for the excess response to the 
monetary shock in the later quarters.  
The ‘bank capital channel’ is also apparent from the response of excess capital. 
While the well-capitalized bank was able to adjust dividends to smooth the path of excess 
capital, the poorly capitalized bank cannot lower dividends below zero. Consequently, its 
equity is actually more volatile than the unconstrained and the well-capitalized banks’ 
equity. 
The response of the stock of loans to the interest rate shock is easy to understand 
given the behavior of new lending. At first the decline is lower for the financially 
constrained bank. After about three quarters, the decline is larger, eventually by about 0.9 
percentage points after 12 quarters, which amounts to an amplification of 35%. 
The value of excess capital of 0.05, for which figure 7 shows the impulse 
response, was chosen to illustrate all facets of the bank capital channel. At the 4
th 
percentile in the distribution of excess capital, it is not an extremely common occurrence. 
At higher, but still below average, levels of excess capital, the initial delay quickly   32
diminishes as lending is no longer ‘quantity constrained’ by the level of capital. 
However, the future amplification, though weaker, still occurs. For example, with the 
same other initial states, a 15
th percentile bank (Z = 0.07) will see an amplification of 
25% after 12 quarters.  
The effect of a given size monetary policy shock may also depend on the initial 
interest rate. Figure 8 documents the response functions of the ‘average’ bank with the 
initial interest rate equal to 6% ( 0.06     0 = r ), which is slightly above the average of 5.5%. 
With this higher initial interest rate, the bank capital channel is stronger. This is due to 
three reasons. First, in the model expected profits are lower when the interest rate is high. 
This means that the bank is less likely to be able to adjust dividends to limit movements 
in excess capital when the interest rate rises even further. Second, a given decline in 
excess capital has a larger effect on lending when equity is already low, which is more 
likely to happen with the higher rates. Third, at r = 0.07, following the shock, lending 
opportunities can only get better, so precautionary lending cuts are more pronounced (see 
section IV.B). The importance of the second and third effects is apparent from the fact 
that the ‘excess response’ of loans is actually a bit larger than for the poorly capitalized 
bank at r0 = 0.05 (1.1% versus 0.9% at 12 quarters), even though the decline in excess 
capital is smaller. 
Because the bank capital channel is more potent when bank profitability is already 
low, successive monetary tightenings are predicted to have increasingly negative effects 
on bank lending. This is true conditional on a given bank balance sheet, as the above 
results show. In addition, the capitalization of most banks is likely to be worse when the 
monetary authority has already tightened once, so that the response of aggregate bank 
lending is can be even more sensitive to the initial interest rate than the above figures 
suggest. To illustrate this, I have simulated the response to an interest rate shock of 1000 
banks with mutually independent charge-off and repayment shocks but with the same 
short interest rate process. The initial balance sheets of the banks are randomly drawn 
from their distribution conditional on the initial interest rate being equal to 6%.  With r0 = 
0.06, figure 9 shows the response of the aggregate variables to an increase in r of 100 
basis points.    33
As can be seen, the reaction of the aggregated volume of loans is amplified by 1.5 
percentage points, or 75%, by the bank capital channel. For comparison, when the initial 
interest rate is 5%, the amplification on an aggregate basis is just 0.4 percentage points 
(not shown).  
Moreover, for a negative interest rate innovation, starting from r0 = 6%, the 
response of lending is also much closer to the unconstrained bank’s, with an 
amplification of 35%. This is again due to the nonlinearity of the bank’s policy function, 
which results in a weaker bank capital channel for the interest rate decline. Giovanni 
Dell’Ariccia and Pietro Garibaldi (1998) provide evidence that the response of bank 
lending to interest rate innovations is asymmetric in the U.S. and Mexico, with a more 
rapid response to increases.
41 
Finally, the model can be used to shed some light on the issue of monetary policy 
effectiveness during a ‘capital crunch’. Expansionary monetary policy was deemed by 
many to have been relatively ineffectual in stimulating bank lending during the 1990-91 
recession, especially in New England. One explanation offered for this is that many 
banks were having trouble meeting their capital requirements, so that they could not take 
advantage of the better lending opportunities created by the lower cost of funding.
42 
Figure 10 shows how a significantly undercapitalized bank responds to expansionary 
monetary policy, according to the model. Z0 is set at –0.11, which corresponds to a risk-
weighted capital asset ratio 1 percentage point below the regulatory minimum. Not 
surprisingly, the model predicts that the decrease in the interest rate initially has no effect 
on lending by the undercapitalized bank. However, after two quarters the easier monetary 
policy starts to have a very strong impact on lending. Thus, according to the model, if the 
slump in bank lending was due to a ‘capital crunch’, it would have lasted much longer 
without the easier monetary policy. 
 
 
                                                      
41 Dell’Ariccia and Garibaldi provide an explanation based on a difference between the speed at which new 
loans become available and the speed at which banks can recall existing loans. 
42 See Bernanke and Lown (1991) for a discussion. See Peek and Rosengren (1995) for evidence on the 
‘capital crunch’ for New England banks.    34
VI.  Loan Default Shocks 
  
To examine the effect of loan defaults, we construct the impulse response 
functions to a loan charge-off shocks in an analogous fashion as for the interest rate 
innovations. For example, for new loans the response is defined as 
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As the loan default shock of size  ω Δ  takes place during period zero, at the beginning of 
that period no balance sheet or decision variables are affected.
43 
  Figure 11 shows the response of an ‘average’ bank to a one standard deviation 
loan default rate shock ( 0024 . 0 = Δω ), at r0 = 0.06 ( ) 06 . 0 ), E( ), E( ; ( Res , L E t x ω ). Due to 
the negative effect of the loan defaults on bank capital, new lending declines in period 1 
and stays lower for several periods. This contrasts with the financially unconstrained 
bank whose lending is unaffected by any charge-offs. Of course, the book value of both 
banks’ loans declines due to the defaults. Due to the reduction in lending, the financially 
constrained bank's loans decline by an additional quarter percent, roughly doubling the 
decline. 
Just as is the case for monetary policy shocks, the impact of defaults on loans is 
larger for a poorly capitalized bank as due to an increased likelihood that the bank will be 
faced with binding regulatory or financial constraints. For example, a bank with excess 
capital at 15% percentile (Z0 = 0.07) will on average see a cumulative decline in loans is 
of over 1 percent after 6 quarters due to the same 0.24% charge-off shock.  
 
 
VII.  Discussion 
  
  The model presented analyzes the decision problem of an individual bank. Several 
additional issues would arise in incorporating it in a general equilibrium framework. For 
                                                      
43 A difference with the definition of the impulse response function to an interest rate shock is that ω1 is 
now not treated as a random variable in order to be able to ‘apply the shock’ and stay inside the support of 
the distribution of ω.   35
example, loan demand and charge-offs may vary with economic activity and this could 
have a potentially important feedback on the bank’s problem. I now discuss some of 
these issues and how they affect the way in which the model’s implications on bank-level 
quantities translate into conclusions about aggregate variables. 
  First, banks compete for clients in making loans. By assuming that the loan 
demand curve facing the individual bank is independent of the short interest rate, I have 
abstracted from interbank competition. Suppose instead that there is perfect competition 
between banks because borrowers can switch costlessly from one bank to any other. In 
that case, only aggregate bank capital matters for aggregate lending, as borrowers would 
switch to the lowest cost lenders. In addition, if there are any financially unconstrained 
banks, the bank capital channel would cease to exist with zero switching costs.
44 One 
would not expect banks to hold any excess capital in this case, as lending is no longer 
strictly profitable, nor would bank-specific variables affect the cost of loans to firms. 
Both implications are contradicted by the data.
45 As argued, banks do in fact have some 
market power due to customer relations, product differentiation, etc. This means that 
switching costs are positive for at least a subset of borrowers. In the extreme case that all 
borrowers face infinite switching costs, any change in an individual bank’s lending 
causes aggregate lending to move one for one. Due to the nonlinear effect of capital on 
lending, not only aggregate bank capital but also its distribution across banks affects 
aggregate lending in this case, with a mean preserving spread of excess capital lowering 
aggregate lending. Moreover, a bank capital channel exists, even if there are some banks 
with perfect access to the market for bank equity. 
In the more realistic case where switching costs are positive but finite, part of the 
idiosyncratic fluctuations in individual bank lending will be picked up, at some cost, by 
other banks; the remainder will result in changes in aggregate lending. Low switching 
cost would diminish the importance of individual bank capital to aggregate lending, other 
things being equal.
46 
                                                      
44 This is true of the bank lending channel as well. See Stein (1998). 
45 See, for example, Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia (2001). 
46 Wouter J. Den Haan, Garey Ramey and Joel Watson (2003) present a model of long-term credit relations, 
where the cost of switching for a borrower is the production forgone in the time it takes to find a match 
with a new lender.    36
  A second and important issue concerns the fact that net charge-offs on loans are 
countercyclical. By reducing economic activity, contractionary monetary policy may 
result in increased net charge-offs, which would in turn lower bank capital. This 
mechanism seems likely to amplify the bank capital channel. 
 
 
VIII.  Conclusion 
 
This paper has analyzed a dynamic model of optimal bank lending that 
incorporates risk-based capital requirements and an imperfect market for bank equity. 
Under these conditions bank lending depends on the bank’s capital structure, which in 
turn evolves endogenously. An important implication of the relevance of the bank’s 
capital adequacy is that shocks to bank profits, such as loan defaults, can have a 
persistent impact on lending. This is akin to the ‘financial accelerator’ mechanism that 
arises in firm models with imperfect financial markets, such as Bernanke, Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1999). While these models usually focus on the firm’s debt capacity being 
limited by the level of inside equity, for banks the mechanism is operative even without 
an imperfect debt market, because the regulatory capital requirements make (inside or 
outside) equity itself indispensable. 
  Another somewhat special characteristic of banks is that they transform short 
liabilities into longer assets. Combined with the relevance of the bank’s capital adequacy, 
this gives rise to a ‘bank capital channel’ by which monetary policy can change the 
supply of bank loans through its impact on bank equity. An implication is that monetary 
policy effects on bank lending depend on the capital adequacy and the profitability of the 
banking sector. In particular, lending by banks with low capital has a delayed and then 
amplified reaction to interest rate shocks, relative to well-capitalized banks.  
  The model also provides a useful framework for analyzing the effectiveness of 
capital regulations in preventing bank failures and limiting the costs of deposit insurance. 
To explore this issue in more detail, a useful extension of the model would give the bank 
an explicit choice with respect to the risk characteristics of its assets, since the capital 
regulations can generate both risk-averse and risk-loving preferences on the part of the 
bank.   37
APPENDIX A. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. 
 
It is convenient to work with a transformed state-space. Define  tt t QL ρ ≡  and let 
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To find a solution to the Bellman equation, assume W is differentiable. Using shorthand notation, 
the first-order conditions are: 
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where ψt is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier associated with the regulatory constraint, 
11 1 1 1 1 1 (,,, ) tt t t t t t WE W E L Q r E ++ + + + + + ∂∂ ≡ ∂ ∂ , etc. The envelope condition with respect to equity is: 
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where the last equality follows from the first-order condition with respect to D. This implies: 
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Using this we can write the envelope condition with respect to L as: 
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Since 0 < θt < 1, the forward solution for Yt converges, so that 
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That the right-hand side is a function of rt only follows from the assumption that rt is a sufficient 
statistic for the time t distribution of all future exogenous shocks. Applying the same steps to the 
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Hence, W is given by: 
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We can now rewrite the first-order condition with respect to N as: 
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It is easy to verify that the left hand side depends only on Nt and rt and, given the assumptions on 
ρ( ) and b( ), that it is decreasing in Nt. Hence, Nt is uniquely determined and is a function of rt 
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We have already established that ψ > 0, which implies that the regulatory constraint is binding. 
Thus, 
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Given the policy functions,  0() t arcan be solved for from the Bellman equation, again by solving 
forward. This also completely verifies that our candidate W satisfies the Bellman equation and 
that it is the only differentiable function that does. Standard arguments can be used to show that it 
is indeed the true value function (in the transformed state-space). 
Finally, V
U is derived from W as follows: 
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APPENDIX B. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. 
 
Proof is by contradiction. Suppose 
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where the laws of motion (1), (2), (4), (6) and (7) apply as usual. Given(,,) tt t Lr ρ , 
T
t E  is the 
minimum level of equity at the beginning of period t that makes it feasible for the bank to lend at 
the unconstrained level in periods t through t+T with probability 1. If 
T
tt E E <  then, with positive 
probability, the proposed policy (
U N() tt N r = for all t) would involve a violation of the capital 
requirement (8) even if dividends are kept at the minimum level of zero. Since 
T
t E  is increasing 
in T, the following limit exists in { }
+ ∪∞ \ : 
 







If  t E =∞for any t, then the proposed lending policy is not feasible and we are done. From now 
on, assume t E <∞. 
 
Claim 1: With the proposed lending policy (
U N() tt N r = for all t) the bank will 
choose ttt DEE =−. 
 
Proof:   (i) Suppose ttt DEE >−. Then, from the law of motion of equity (6) and the definition 
of t E , it is immediate that there exists a finite T  such that, with 
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(the financial constraint) for allu∈`, 
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the capital requirement (8) with positive probability.  
(ii) Now suppose that for some t0 we have
00 o ttt D EE < − . For all  0 tt ≥  define  t ε  by 
writing:  
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We have already established that, for the proposed lending policy to be feasible, it must be true 
that 0 t ε ≥  for all t, and we have supposed that
0 0 t ε > . Starting from the same
0 t s , consider the 
alternative financial policy of keeping post-dividends equity exactly equal to t E : 
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policy. From the definition of  t E  it is immediate that the lending policy, 
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Hence, the original choice,
00 o ttt D EE <−, cannot be optimal. This concludes the proof of claim 1. 
 
Claim 2: With the proposed lending policy, the following must hold a.s. for all t: 
0 t D > and () 1 tt Vs E ∂∂ = . 
 
Proof:  First we prove 0 t D > . From the financial constraint, we already know that 0 t D ≥ . It 
remains to be shown that, for any t, Pr[ 0] 0 t D = = . Claim 1 implies that this is equivalent 
toPr[ ] 0 tt EE == . A sufficient condition for this is  1 Pr[ | ] 0 tt t EE s − = = for all st-1. Now 
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11 N( ) tt N r −− = . This expression is strictly decreasing in t ω . Conditional on st-1,  t ω is 
distributed according to a density without mass points (as F is continuous with respect to ω). It is 
true that  t E  may vary with  t ω  as well, through  t L  and t ρ , but if it does, then it will also vary 
with  t δ  -  see  (1) and (2). Conditional on st-1 and t ω , t δ   is distributed according to a density 
without mass points (again, this is implied by the continuity of F). Hence, 
1 Pr[ | ] 0 tt t EE s − == and 0 t D > , a.s.  
  We can now prove the second part of the claim. Since  ttt DEE = −  and tt E E > , almost 
surely, we have for any  t DE −< Δ < ∞ ,   (, , , ) ( , , , ) t t tr t t tr VE EL r VEL r E ρ ρ + Δ= + Δ  a.s.  (cf. 
(12)). Rewriting and taking the limit of 0 E Δ → , we have a.s. () 1 tt Vs E ∂ ∂= . 
 
With the existence of a derivative of the value function with respect to equity, the optimal 
















−+ − = ⎢⎥ +∂ ⎣⎦
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where μt ≥ 0 is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier associated with the financial constraint (10) and 
0 t ψ ≥  is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier associated with the capital requirement (8). Since 0 t D > , μt 
= 0, a.s. Moreover,  [] 11 E( ) 1 ttt Vs E ++ ∂∂ = , so /(1 ) 0 tt t rr ψ τ = +> . This implies that the capital 
requirement binds, a.s., for all t:   ( ) tt tt E DL N γ − =+ or
U (N ( ) ) ( )
U
tt t t t D EL r D s γ =− + = , the 
dividends paid by an unconstrained bank with the same state. But this implies that with the 
proposed lending policy we have a.s. 
U () N() tt N sr = a n d  () ()
U
tt D sD s =  for  all  t.  But this 
implies that the bank will make exactly the same choices, and have the same sequence of states, 
as an unconstrained bank with the same initial conditions s0 and the same sequence of shocks. 
However, by assumption to the proposition this involvesPr[ ( ) 0] 0
U
t Ds< > , implying a violation 
of the financial constraint with positive probability. This is a contradiction. Hence, 




APPENDIX C.  COMPUTATIONAL DETAILS. 
 
The main features of the algorithm are: 
1.  Modified policy iteration (see Kenneth L. Judd (1998), pp. 416-417) is used on a finite grid. 
The choice variables remain continuous however, and simplicial interpolation is used to 
evaluate the value function at non-grid points.  
2.  The grid is uniform with respect to L. Z = E – γL is used as a state instead of E, as the value 
function has a kink at Z = 0. The grid is denser around Z = 0 as the value function is most 
nonlinear in that area. 
3.  The optimization routine uses a BFGS algorithm with line search, modified to deflect the 
search direction when either inequality constraint is hit. Specifically, when the BFGS line 
search moves into ε distance of a binding constraint, a new BFGS direction is computed 
without a Hessian update. If this new direction violates the inequality constraint, a steepest 
ascent direction, if necessary deflected to move along the inequality constraint, is used for the 
next linesearch. After a (deflected) steepest ascent search no Hessian update is performed.  
4.  To avoid nonglobal optima, local searches are preceded by a global search every nth value 
iteration. Otherwise, optimization uses as starting value the optimum from the previous value 
iteration at the same grid point.  
5.  Integration with respect to ω and δ, conditional on r, is Monte-Carlo. Since r is assumed to 
have finite support, integration with respect to r is exact.  
6.  For  Z  ≥ 0 and ΔZ  ≥ 0,  ( , , ) ( , , ) VZ ZLr VZLr Z +Δ ≥ +Δ , since the additional capital can 
always be paid out as dividends (see (12)). This fact can be used to economize on 
computation. Let Zmax be the highest level of Z on the grid and fix L and r. Then, for all 
max max (, , ) Z ZD Z L r ≥−   on the grid, we have, at each iteration, 
max (,,) ( ,,) VZLr VZ Lr Z =− Δ ,  max (,,) ( ,,) DZLr DZ Lr Z = −Δ  and 
max (,,) ( ,,) N ZLr NZ Lr = , where max Z ZZ Δ =− . 
7.  The initial guess for the value function is V
U, which is computed, using proposition 1, prior to 
the main algorithm. 
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APPENDIX D.   OVERLENDING 
 
To inspect the mechanism behind the overlending phenomenon it is useful to examine a 
special case of the model by assuming full and certain repayment of all loans in one quarter: 
1 t δ ≡ and 0 ( , ) t bN ω ω ≡= .
47 In this special case, when Et > γLt, the first order conditions with 
respect to new loans simplifies to:  
 




E1 M R ( ) ( 1 )
tt









−− = + ⎢⎥ ∂ ⎣⎦
 
 
w h e r e  M R () (()) / ' () () N dN N d N N N N ρ ρρ ≡= +  is the marginal revenue from new loans and 
ψ (≥ 0) is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier associated with the regulatory constraint, (8). Note that L 
and ρ  are no longer required as state variables due to the full repayment of loans within the 
quarter. The above first order condition applies equally to the constrained and unconstrained 
banks.  
 For  the  unconstrained bank, we know from proposition 1 that the marginal value of 
equity is 1 and that the capital requirement is always binding, so that ψt > 0. In fact, Appendix A 
shows that /(1 ) tt t rr ψ τ =+ . Hence, for this special case, optimal lending for the unconstrained 
bank satisfies: 
 
 MR( ) /(1 )
U
ttt Nrr γττ =+ −  
 
For the constrained bank the capital requirement may or may not be binding. Suppose 
that it is momentarily nonbonding, so that ψt = 0. In the context of this special case this can 
happen if the current short rate is high and there is a sufficiently high probability of a decline in r 
(so that not much capital is needed now but much more may be needed next period to satisfy the 
capital requirement with higher lending). Optimal lending with ψt = 0 is given by 
 
MR( ) tt N r =  
 
Because MR is a decreasing function of N, it follows that 
U N() tt N r >  whenever the capital 




                                                      
47 An appendix in a previous version of this paper analyzed the overlending in a simplified two period 
model with δ  < 1 and ω > 0. This appendix is available from the author upon request. 
48 The result that overlending always occurs when the capital requirement is slack, is specific to this special 
case.   43
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Table 1.1. Parameters values (at annual rates): 
  γ  0.08      
  τ  0.40      
  ρ
0  0.08      
  α  4.00      
  η  8.00      
  π
F  - 0.094       
        
Distribution of:  Min:  Mode:  Max:   
  ω  - 0.005  0.005 0.040  
  δ  0.200 0.250 0.300  
 
 
Table 1.2. Interest rate process 
Transition probabilities:  Pr[rt+1|rt] 
  rt+1 =0.04  rt+1 =0.05  rt+1 =0.06  rt+1 =0.07 
rt = 0.04  0.8  0.2 0.0 0.0
rt = 0.05  0.1  0.8 0.1 0.0
rt = 0.06  0.0  0.1 0.8 0.1
rt = 0.07  0.0  0.0 0.2 0.8
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Table 2. Unconstrained value and policy functions 
  r = 0.04  r = 0.05  r = 0.06  r = 0.07 
N
U(r) 0.897  0.868  0.803 0.722
a0(r)  0.111  0.060  - 0.031 - 0.077




Table 3. Simulated moments 
Variable  Expected value  Standard deviation  Autocorrelation 
Z = E-γL  0.0958 0.0243 0.5971
L  11.4519 1.1502 0.9940 
N  0.8056 0.1151 0.8442 
D  0.0161 0.0186 0.5439 
π  0.0267 0.0411 0.4135 




Table 4. Distribution of over- and underlending 
Overlending Frequency 
(%) 
n = - 1   0.9 
-1 < n ≤ - 0.2    5.2 
- 0.2 < n ≤ - 0.1    4.3 
- 0.1 < n ≤ - 0.05    3.6 
- 0.05 < n ≤ - 0.01    6.1 
- 0.01 < n ≤ 0    4.8 
0 < n ≤ 0.01    50.8 
0.01 < n ≤ 0.05    24.2 
n > 0.05  0.0
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Figure 1. Histograms of key variables 
   50
Figure 2. Bank value as a function of excess capital   51
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Figure 4. Optimal policy as a function of excess capital for r1 = 0.05 and r2 = 0.06 
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Figure 5a. Optimal Bank Policy: New Loans 
 
Figure 5b. Optimal Bank Policy: Dividends 
   54
Figure 6. Response to interest rate shock: ‘average’ bank 
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Figure 7. Response to interest rate shock: regulatory constraint binding   56
Figure 8. Response to interest rate shock when initial rate is high:  
‘average’ bank 
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Figure 9. Aggregate response to interest rate shock with initial interest rate at 6%.   58
Figure 10. Response to expansionary monetary policy by undercapitalized bank 
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Figure 11. Response to loan default shock: ‘average’ bank 
 